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(District Court No.:  1:18-cv-00386) 
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_____________________________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 2, 2020 
 
(Filed: August 27, 2020) 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
 




RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




Appellant Oliver Grier, Jr., challenges the District Court’s decision to affirm the 
Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) denial of his application for supplemental security 
income (SSI).  Grier argues that the ALJ and the District Court failed to consider his need 
for a supportive environment and improperly discounted the opinions of his treating 
physicians.  We agree that consideration of the impact of a supportive environment on 
Grier’s ability to work was warranted, and we will therefore vacate and remand for 
further proceedings. 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
On August 27, 2013, Grier filed a claim for SSI and alleged disability on the basis 
of mental impairments that caused him difficulty working around large numbers of 
people.1  At the time, he was 23 with limited education and past work experience.  He 
had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, among other psychological issues. 
The state disability agency referred Grier for an in-person examination with a 
psychologist, Kimberlyn R. Watson, Ph.D.  Dr. Watson conducted the examination in 
November 2013 and found no evidence of an active psychotic disorder, although she 
diagnosed paranoid personality features, bipolar disorder, learning disability, and social 
anxiety disorder all by history.  She emphasized that Grier “seems to function well with 
his current level of stressors” and noted that he has “a very structured life with limited 
exposure to a wide range of individuals who are unknown to him.”  Tr. 333.  Overall, Dr. 
 
1 Appellant had previously applied for SSI in 2012, but the SSA denied his claim at the 




Watson evaluated Grier’s Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score as 57, 
indicating moderate symptoms or functioning difficulties. 
Dr. Watson also completed an evaluation form concerning specific functional 
areas.  She assessed Grier as moderately impaired in relating to others and, with respect 
to his daily living activities, mildly restricted when in his own space, but moderately 
restricted when around crowds.  Dr. Watson found a moderate limitation in coping with 
the pressures of ordinary work and only mild limitations in understanding simple 
instructions, carrying out instructions under ordinary supervision, performing routine or 
repetitive tasks under ordinary supervision, and sustaining work performance and 
attendance in a normal work setting. 
Two non-examining specialists reviewed and agreed with Dr. Watson’s 
conclusions.  In January 2014, the state disability agency referred the case to Charlene 
Tucker-Okine, Ph.D., who agreed that Grier was only mildly or moderately limited in 
functional abilities relevant to work performance.  After Grier sought reconsideration, the 
state agency referred the case to Christopher King, Psy.D., who reviewed the file.  On 
August 13, 2014, Dr. King agreed that Grier was only mildly or moderately limited in 
abilities relevant to sustained work performance.  Both Dr. King and Dr. Tucker-Okine 
determined, based on their review of Grier’s file, that he could “handle simple tasks in a 
low contact environment.”  Tr. 76, 89. 
Twice in 2014, Grier was hospitalized when he stopped taking his medication and 




engaging in violent behavior and demonstrating paranoia.  He was transferred to the 
Delaware Psychiatric Center, where he improved after resuming medication and 
treatment.  He was discharged on April 22, 2014, with a GAF score of 55.  His personal 
discharge plan stated that he would rely on “family and friends[’] support” in his 
recovery and that he felt “unsafe” in “big crowds.”  Tr. 475.  In October 2014, Grier was 
again hospitalized after non-compliance with medication.  He presented with auditory 
hallucinations, paranoia, and agitation.  After an 11-day stay at the Rockford Center, 
during which he resumed medication and therapy, he was discharged with a GAF score 
of 50. 
In addition to the foregoing records, the ALJ who assessed Grier’s SSI application 
considered records from Grier’s treating psychiatrist at the time of the hearing, Lavinia 
Park, MD; his former treating psychiatrist, Ralph Kaufman, MD; and his mental health 
case manager, Carlos Mackell, MS.  In a questionnaire completed at the request of the 
state, Mackell emphasized Grier’s challenges with memory, concentration, and 
completing tasks.  Mackell also noted, however, that Grier could interact with others 
positively and engage in various activities.  Nonetheless, Mackell concluded that Grier 
requires support from RHD staff or his parents, and that his condition “cause[s] him to 
not be capable of working at this time.”  Tr. 423.  In other reports, Mackell noted that 
Grier “relies heavily on his” family, and especially his mother, who “pay[s] his bills and 
provide[s] him with money on a weekly basis”; relies on his family for transportation; 




also observed that Grier had “[g]ood family suppor[t],” despite his hallucinations, 
delusions, and isolation.  Tr. 581. 
Dr. Kaufman’s notes from around the same time—when he was Grier’s treating 
psychiatrist—indicate some panic attacks, paranoia, and hallucinations, but his notes also 
emphasize that, with medication, Grier steadily improved and engaged in certain 
activities.  Similarly, Dr. Kaufman’s notes from after Grier’s second hospitalization 
indicate that he improved, was not exhibiting delusional symptoms or having racing 
thoughts, and was able to spend time doing activities.  On February 2, 2015, Dr. Kaufman 
completed a Delaware Health and Social Services Medical Certification in which he 
opined that Grier could not work at his usual occupation and would not be able to 
perform any other work full time.  Dr. Kaufman’s subsequent notes, however, indicate 
that Grier’s delusional thinking was only occasional and “d[id] not appear to impact him 
so much.”  Tr. 592.  The same records indicate that Grier increasingly left the house and 
engaged in social activities with his family members.  
Dr. Park offered similar assessments about Grier’s ability to work, although her 
records also showed improvement.  In March 2016, just after Dr. Park took over Grier’s 
care from Dr. Kaufman, she submitted a medical summary in which she observed that 
Grier had schizophrenia, could not work full-time, and required supervision.  She noted, 
however, that his condition had improved since his October 2014 hospitalization and that 
his medication effectively managed auditory hallucinations, paranoia, and mood.  
Records also indicate that Grier was increasingly active and social, including going out to 




anxiety.  Dr. Park’s August 2016 notes specifically recount normal, logical thought 
processes.  Nonetheless, in a questionnaire around the same time, Dr. Park recorded that, 
despite the use of medications, Grier continued to struggle with anxiety, panic attacks, 
paranoia, and delusions.  Dr. Park wrote that Grier had a poor ability to work in 
proximity with others, deal with the public, or travel in unfamiliar places.  She also found 
that he had a serious limitation in his ability to maintain attention, maintain attendance, 
be punctual, respond to changes appropriately, deal with normal work stress, set realistic 
goals, maintain socially appropriate behavior, and use public transportation. 
In October 2016, ALJ Jack Penca conducted a hearing and evaluated the record.  
The ALJ heard from Grier, his mother, his attorney, and a vocational expert.  He also 
reviewed Dr. Watson’s November 2013 examination report, the reports from Dr. Tucker-
Okine and Dr. King, and the records from Grier’s hospitalizations and treatment through 
2016. 
The ALJ found that Grier had the severe impairment of schizophrenia but that the 
impairment did not meet a mental listing for per se disability.  The ALJ then assessed 
Grier’s residual functional capacity (RFC) and determined that Grier could sustain work 
in a job with “simple, unskilled tasks; no fast pace or strict production requirements; 
occasional interaction with co-workers, with no teamwork or tandem tasks; and no 
interaction with the public.”  Tr. 24.   
In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ afforded “great weight” to the opinions of the 
Agency specialists, Dr. Watson, Dr. Tucker-Okine, and Dr. King, that Grier had no more 




that Grier’s functionality remained equivalent to the functionality that the Agency 
specialists found in their evaluations, so long as he complied with treatment.  Although 
the ALJ acknowledged that Grier had twice been hospitalized in 2014, he emphasized 
that those episodes resulted from non-compliance with medication and that, since the 
hospitalizations, Grier had demonstrated increased activity and independence, which 
corroborated the conclusions of the Agency specialists. 
The ALJ gave “no weight” to the opinions of Appellant’s treating physicians and 
case manager.  Tr. 27.  He found their conclusions that Grier’s limitations would prevent 
full-time work inconsistent with the record and the physicians’ notes.  Based primarily on 
the Agency physicians’ reports and the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ 
concluded that Grier was not disabled from the date of his application through the date of 
the decision.  The Appeals Council denied a request for review.   
Grier argued before the District Court that the ALJ erred in his assessment of the 
opinions of the treating providers and in failing to consider Grier’s need for a structured 
living environment.  The Court found that both the ALJ’s evaluation of the treating 
providers’ medical opinions and the ALJ’s finding that Grier could function outside a 
structured living environment were supported by substantial evidence.  Finding that 
substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination regarding Grier’s RFC, the 




Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment.  It then denied a motion to alter or 
amend the judgment, and Grier now appeals.2 
II. Standard of Review 
Like the District Court, we exercise plenary review over the ALJ’s legal 
conclusions and review the factual findings for substantial evidence.  42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 
Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 610-11 (3d Cir. 2014).  Substantial evidence is “such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.”  Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (citation omitted).  
Although “we owe deference to [the ALJ’s] evaluation of the evidence, assessment of the 
credibility of witnesses, and reconciliation of conflicting expert opinions,” remand is 
necessary “where we cannot ascertain whether the ALJ truly considered competing 
evidence, and whether a claimant’s conditions, individually and collectively, impacted” 
his ability to work.  Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 506 (3d Cir. 2009).  
III. Discussion 
Grier raises two issues on appeal.  First, he contends that the ALJ did not 
adequately evaluate the medical opinion evidence.  Second, he argues that the ALJ failed 
to consider his need for a supportive environment when formulating the RFC. 
We need not address whether the ALJ erred in how it weighed the medical 
evidence because we agree that the ALJ failed to consider Grier’s need for a structured 
living environment.  In addition to medical evidence, RFC assessments “must be based 
 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  We have jurisdiction to 




on all of the relevant evidence in the case record, such as . . . [n]eed for structured living 
environment.”  SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996).  Failure to address crucial 
facts, such as the need for a structured environment, may warrant remand.  See Burnett v. 
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000).  Here, the ALJ’s brief 
discussion of Grier’s need for a structured environment was inadequate and overlooked 
crucial evidence. 
 The government contends that the ALJ’s brief references to Grier’s environment 
provided sufficient consideration of Grier’s need for a structured environment.  We 
disagree.  The ALJ failed to discuss specific evidence pertaining to the significance of 
Grier’s structured living environment.  For instance, most of the activities to which the 
ALJ pointed as evidence of Grier’s ability to engage in the community without support 
were activities—swimming, yard work, exercise—that he only enjoyed when in the 
company of close family or friends.  Similarly, Dr. Watson’s evaluation, to which the 
ALJ attributed “great weight,” Tr. 26, noted that Grier currently has “a very structured 
life with limited exposure to a wide range of individuals who are unknown to him” and 
that he “functions well within his current level of stressors” in such a structured 
environment.  Tr. 333.  This evidence suggests that Grier’s success may be the result of 
his current environment, which is quite structured and involves limited exposure to 
unfamiliar individuals.  Yet the ALJ did not consider this possibility. 
The ALJ also emphasized Grier’s ability to function when compliant with 
medication but did not examine whether Grier requires a supportive environment in order 




take his medication, and Grier’s two hospitalizations due to noncompliance, both of 
which occurred even when in a supportive environment, corroborate the view that 
support may be essential to Grier maintaining medication compliance.  The ALJ 
acknowledged the hospitalizations and repeatedly qualified Grier’s stable condition as 
dependent on medication compliance.  But the ALJ never considered the need for a 
structured environment to ensure such compliance.  Because the ALJ failed to adequately 
consider this important issue, we will remand to allow for consideration of Grier’s need 
for a supportive environment. 
IV. Conclusion  
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s order and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
